Tuesday, January 24, 2017

Ukraine and the “Other”

           The etymology of Ukraine can be traced to Old Slavic as meaning border and the USSR referring to it as “the” Ukraine or “the” borderland. Thus, Ukraine “lacks a history of its own” and is historically considered a borderland or territorial component of the Polish- Lithuanian Commonwealth, Austro-Hungarian Empire, and Russian Empire/Soviet Russia. The territorial split of Ukraine between differing powers has left a weakened footprint on the nation’s identity as a cultural east/west and ethno-linguistic (Ukrainian/Russian) split. According to the scholar, Von Hagen (1995), Ukraine is an artificially constructed nation, formed out of the post-communist fallout of Soviet Russia and likewise has a politically instrumented national identity. In addition, Russia’s hindering presence as a significant internal and external “other” poses a threat to the still developing notion of Ukrainian national identity. This post will discretely map a multi-faceted, dynamic Ukrainian identity that constantly serves the agenda to affirm its autonomy from their evident “other”, Russia.
            The formation of Ukrainian national identity is split into two defining periods. The first period aligns with the 1991 independence of the state and the nationalist attempt to construct a unified identity of what it meant to be Ukrainian. The second falls into the period of the Orange and Euromaidan revolutions (2010-2014) and its role in redefining said identity. Stephan Shulman (1999) states that amidst the collapse of the Soviet Union, Ukrainian Nationals constructed political and cultural ethnic myths to produce collectivism and a sense that Ukrainians had a unique path of history from the “all-Russian history” of Eastern Slavs. Shulman (1999) adds that this new identity was the categorization of Ukrainians as a peasant people with a deep love of folk dance/song and origin from the Cossacks that defied Polish rule. It is important to note that the definition of Ukrainian identity is still synonymous with Ukrainian ethnicity/language and refers to said identity as tolerant of other ethnicities that share the same land (Tatars, Jews, and Russians). The last defining characteristic of the formulated Ukrainian persona is emphasis on emotional romanticism or an existential, poetic world view (Shulman, 1999). The newly constructed identity may encompass the vast, majority of western ethnic Ukrainians (77%), but there is still a vocal minority of eastern ethnic Russians (17%) and Russian speaking Ukrainians that don’t adhere to said mold (Ukraine Demographics, 2016).
            The second period in the establishment of Ukrainian identity takes form as the Orange and Euromaidan revolutions, which were a series of civil uprisings calling for change in both political figures and ideology. The Orange and Euromaidan revolutions prompted Ukraine’s holistic and political identity to become associated with democratic operation/policy, Western European economic alliances over the previous Russian alliances, and a new ideological embracement of Ukrainian nationality over what was previously exclusive to Ukrainian ethnicity/language. Nadia Diuk (2014) states the recent revolutions prompted the birth of a “new Ukraine”, changing the political and social outlook people hold of their nation. Diuk (2014) continues that Ukraine has defined its identity by becoming a “liberal democratic” institution by popular demand of its collective people. Simultaneously, Ukrainians are associating their future economic prosperity to further establishing alliances with the European Union instead of their authoritarian neighbor, Russia (Diuk, 2014). The Eurasian scholar, Volodymyr Kulyk (2016), states that this period of revolution has prompted Ukrainian’s to embrace uniting under the identity of joint Ukrainian nationality (belonging to the nation of Ukraine) instead of their previous ethno-linguistic identity, which in turn prompted more support from eastern, Russian speaking Ukrainians towards a political collective.
            The next integral part of Ukraine’s national identity is the presence of Russia and ethnic Russians as both external and internal significant others that undermine the autonomy of Ukraine. Triandafyllidou (1998) defines external significant others as (1) “dominant nations”, (2) bordering nations with ongoing territorial disputes, and (3) nations that claim similar origin. Russia falls under the categorization of all three components as an external significant other for Ukraine. For example, Russia has direct political and economic influence upon Ukraine, forcefully annexed the Crimean-peninsula in 2014, and reference back to centuries of Ukraine being territory of Russian rulers indicates much of Russian and Ukrainian origin is interchangeable. In addition, the vocal minority of Ethnic Russians in the east can be considered an internal significant other. In recent years, the overtaking of the Crimean Peninsula, presence of Russian military on Ukrainian land and polar divide in political views can be accredited to ethnic Russians occupying much of Southeast Ukraine. Looking back at Shulman’s (1999) work on the early construction of Ukrainian identity, hostility towards the Russian ideas of immense authoritarianism under the Czar and communism prompted embrace of more political individualism and democracy as Ukrainian identity. In addition, the adoption of emotional romanticism by Ukrainians was due to the rejection of supposed Russia’s “materialism” (Shulman,1999). It is highly evident that the efforts of both early Ukrainian nationalists and modern Ukrainian populists point to Ukrainian national identity being defined as “not Russian”. Analyzing the current redefined identity of Ukraine, through the workings of both the Orange and Euromaidan revolutions, indicate that Ukrainians are uniting socially, economically, and politically against Russian aggression.

            Mark Von Hagen (1995) stated, when asked the question of whether Ukrainian history truly existed, Ukrainian scholars wittily replied “If Ukraine has a future, then Ukraine will have a history”. Ukraine’s historical role as territory of other dominant powers has led lack of myth history to support its narrative of national identity. The attempt of early Ukrainian nationalists to piece together a narrative of national identity out of shambles of the fallen Soviet Union was synonymous with the establishment of Ukrainian ethno-linguistic identity from Cossack peasants. Through the workings of both the Orange and Euromaidan revolutions, Ukraine redefined its identity as national versus ethno-linguistic and garnered political union towards a more democratic and westernized economy across the historically established east/west border. In addition, the othering of Russia and Ethnic Russians as both external and internal significant others correlates to both notions of Ukrainian identity established by early nationalists and the present rejection of Russian aggression.

Work Sited/References:
Diuk, N. "Finding Ukraine." Journal of Democracy, vol. 25 no. 3, 2014, pp. 83-89. Project MUSE, doi:10.1353/jod.2014.0041.
Kulyk, Volodymyr. "National Identity in Ukraine: Impact of Euromaidan and the War." Europe-Asia Studies 68.4 (2016): 588-608. Web.
Shulman, Stephen. "The Cultural Foundations of Ukrainian National Identity." Ethnic & Racial      Studies 22.6 (1999): 1011-1036. Web. 22 Jan. 2017.
 Triandafyllidou, Anna. “National Identity and the ‘Other’.” Ethnic and Racial Studies, vol. 21,     no. 4, 1998, pp. 593–612.
"Ukraine Demographics Profile 2016." Ukraine Demographics Profile 2016. N.p., n.d. Web. 24 Jan. 2017.
Von Hagen, Mark. “Does Ukraine Have a History?” Slavic Review, vol. 54, no. 3, 1995, pp.   658–  673. www.jstor.org/stable/2501741.

Thursday, January 19, 2017

Welcome

This blog will feature Ukraine and focus on its participation in the Eurovision Song Contest.